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INTRODUCTION 
China is usually recognized in economic transition literature as a special case 
which achieved tremendous economic success simply through competitive market forces, 
without fundamental reforms in ownership system. That is, the Chinese model is 
generally regarded as an alternative to the privatization approach which was widely 
adopted in East Europe and Russia for economic and especially State Owned Enterprise 
(SOE) reform1.  
This paper examines the characteristics of the Chinese model and identifies the 
exact nature of China’s SOE reform. For this purpose, this research adopted a 
comprehensive literature review as methodology, with particular focus on existing 
empirical studies on China’s SOE reform and Share Issuance Privatization (SIP). 
Specifically, first, this paper will describe the process and consequences of economic and 
SOE reforms in China. Second, it will identify the patterns and features of China’s 
privatization.  
ECONOMIC AND SOE REFORM IN CHINA 
China officially started economic reform in December 1978. The process of 
economic reform or more precisely the process of SOE reform 2 , according to its 
coherence to certain targets, can be divided into four phases: expanding SOE autonomy 
and fiscal decentralization, contract responsibility system and dual track system, 
corporatization and market economy, and privatization. The major events and policy 
initiatives since 1978 are summarized in table 1. The first part of this paper will briefly 
discuss the first three stages, leaving privatization to be examined separately in more 
detail. The first part of this paper will also review the debate on the nature of Chinese 
reform, including the arguments and empirical evidences presented in both schools. It 
then concludes with the identification of existing problems in SOEs. 
Table 1: Major Events and Policy Initiatives of Economic and SOE Reforms, 1978-
20043 
Year Events and Policy Initiatives New Laws 
and 
Regulations
 
1978 
 
Economic reform officially launched 
 
 
1979 
 
SOE decision-making autonomy and profit retention expanded 
Development of Township and Village Enterprises encouraged 
Law of Joint 
Venture 
                                                 
1  Zhang, Zhibin Ownership, Competition, Organizational Change, and Firm Performance: China’s 
Experience in Privatization, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, The George Washington University, 2004 
2 This research mainly focuses on the reforms in the industrial sector, namely the SOE reforms. Other 
reforms such as agriculture and foreign trade system, which also achieved great success, are omitted.  
3 Data sources are from Gao, S. Two Decades of Reform in China. River Edge, NJ: World Scientific, 1999; 
Jefferson, G., & Rawski, T. China's Emerging Market for Property Rights. Economics of Transition, 10(3), 
585-617, 2002; Qi, G. Major Events of Economic Reform since 1978. People's Daily, 2003, Oct. 20; and 
the author. 
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1981 Individual business encouraged to reduce unemployment Contract 
Law 
 
1982 Commission for Restructuring the Economic System established 
 
New 
Constitution 
1983 ‘Tax for Profit’ and ‘Loan for Appropriation’  
The share of contract workers increased; the use of bonus 
expanded 
Party leaders and SOE managers separated 
 
Interim 
Provisions 
on SOEs 
1986 Contract Responsibility System (CRS) Law of 
Foreign 
Funded 
Enterprises 
 
1987 The share of planning economy dropped to 50%  
70% of SOEs implemented CRS at the end of 1987  
 
 
1988 Price decontrol tried but failed 
Competitive mechanism in the selection of SOE managers 
adopted 
Small SOEs allowed to be leased to private sector 
 
Constitution 
amended to 
recognize 
private 
sector 
SOE Law 
1990 Shanghai Stock Exchange inaugurated  
 
 
1991 Shenzhen Stock Exchange inaugurated 
 
 
1992 The momentum of economic reform renewed by Deng Xiaoping 
Socialist Market Economy defined as ultimate goal of reform  
 
 
1993 Large-scale layoffs 
Price decontrol restarted 
Futures Market inaugurated 
 
Constitution 
amended to 
remove 
‘plan 
economy’  
1997 Deng Xiaoping, the greatest man in modern China, died 
Large scale privatization of small SOEs started 
 
Price Law 
1998 Layoffs in SOEs accelerated 
Central government reorganized 
 
 
1999  Constitution 
amended to 
support 
private 
sector 
 
2000  Private 
Enterprise 
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Law 
 
2001 Access to WTO 
 
 
2002 Communist Party opened door for private entrepreneurs 
 
 
2003 New State Assets Management Commission established 
Proposed constitutional amendment backs private property 
 
 
2004  Constitution 
amended to 
back private 
property 
 
Expansion of SOE Autonomy and Fiscal Decentralization (1978-1983) 
China started economic reform in industry4 with the initiatives of expanding SOE 
autonomy and promoting incentives, aiming at improving the operation of SOEs5. In 
1979, SOEs were granted marginal authority and control over decisions about marketing, 
technical innovation, and, most importantly, the quantity and variety of output beyond 
mandatory planning targets. Meanwhile, SOEs were allowed to retain part of their total 
profit. The retained profit was required to deposit into three different funds – welfare, 
bonus, and investment6. Consequently, worker bonuses were adopted widely and rapidly 
in SOEs as a major component of employee compensation to boost incentives.  
Besides granting SOEs autonomous authority and control over operation, the 
Chinese government decentralized its fiscal system as well. In 1980, a revenue sharing 
system was established for the central and local governments to ‘eat at separate kitchens,’ 
encouraging local governments to develop their own revenues7.  
Contract Responsibility System and Dual Track System (1984-1991)     
The second phase of economic reform witnessed further expansions of SOE 
autonomy and the introduction of a dual track (plan and market) system with an attempt 
to strengthen the responses of SOEs to market forces. Dating from 1984, the contract 
responsibility system was implemented to supplant plan targets and to promote additional 
enterprise autonomy. Under this system, SOE managers or the entire work force signed a 
contract with the supervising government to fulfill specific total profit targets, long-term 
profit remittances, productivity increases, in return for extensive control over enterprise 
operations, including production plan inside the enterprise, substantial retention of excess 
                                                 
4 Naughton indicates that most accounts which hold that Chinese reforms began in the countryside are 
actually inaccurate. Rural reforms were launched later than industrial reforms but reaped tremendous 
success by 1984, much earlier than the still troubled and uncertain status of industrial reforms. The Chinese 
publicists thus usually claim that reforms had begun agriculture. 
5 Lin, J. Y., Cai, F., & Li, Z. The China Miracle: Development Strategy and Economic Reform (Revised 
ed.). Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2003 
6 Naughton, B. Growing out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978-1993. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995 (henceforth Growing out of the Plan) 
7  Ma, J., & Norregaard, J. China's Fiscal Decentralization. Unpublished manuscript, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, 1998. 
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profit, and wage distribution8. The contract responsibility system then spread through 
other areas of economic reforms.  
In the beginning of economic reform, SOEs were allowed to transact marginal 
supplies and commodities outside the plan at market prices which responded increasingly 
to the forces of demand and supply, with the persistence of compulsory deliveries at state 
fixed prices in the planning sectors. A dual track system of plan and market, namely the 
coexistence of commending plan and market channel for resource allocation and goods 
pricing, emerged, evolving into a most striking feature of the Chinese approach to 
reform9. This Chinese characteristic then pervaded every aspect of economic reform, 
including sectoral reform, regional development, price decontrol, labor market 
development, foreign trade promotion, central-local fiscal arrangement, and even 
ownership reform10. 
Corporatization and Market Economy (1992-1996) 
Due to political turmoil in 1989, Chinese reform retrenched till 1992 when Deng 
Xiaoping renewed the reform momentum. In October 1992, the 14th Communist Party 
Congress proclaimed that the ultimate objective of economic reform was a “socialist 
market economy”. The year of 1992 marked an irreversible turn for China toward a 
market economy. 
At the apogee of marketization, problems in SOEs persisted, leading to a widely 
accepted recognition that the root of the poor performance of SOEs could not be just 
from the lack of market mechanisms. Ownership transformation, however, was politically 
and ideologically constrained as a solution. Instead, China put its stakes in a Modern 
Enterprise System (MES), attempting to commercialize SOEs into modern corporations 
through introducing the private corporate governance practices. The establishment of two 
stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 1990 and 1991, respectively, created the 
preconditions for the Modern Enterprise System. Corporatization was fully underway 
after the Company Law came into effect in 1994. 
                                                 
8 Jefferson, G., & Rawski, T. “Enterprise Reform in Chinese Industry”. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
8(2), 47-70, 1994 (henceforth “Enterprise Reform”) & Naughton, B. Growing out of the Plan. 
9 Byrd, W. “A Plan and Market in the Chinese Economy: A Simple General Equilibrium Model”. Journal 
of Comparative Economics, 13, 177-204, 1989; Opper, S. “Dual-Track Ownership Reforms: Lessons from  
Structural Change in China”, 1978-1997. Post-Communist Economics, 13(2), 205-227, 2001 (henceforth 
“Dual-Track Ownership”); Tenev, S., Zhang, C., & Brefort, L. Corporate Governance and Enterprise 
Reform in China: Building the Institutions of Modern Markets. Washington, DC: World Bank and 
International Finance Corporation, 2002 (henceforth Corporate Governance). 
10 Sachs, J. D., & Woo, W. T. Understanding China's Economic Performance. NBER Working Paper 
Series, #5935, Cambridge, MA, 1997 (henceforth NBER Working Paper). 
 
Competition or Privatization: China’s Experience in SOE Reform 
 Spring 2006, Vol.1, No.1    41
An Alternative to Privatization? 
Chinese reform achieved astonishing performance as shown in figure 111 in terms 
of the growth of industrial output, GDP, GDP per capita, and exports. It is very clear that 
in the first three phases the Chinese model of reform is totally based on a central 
assumption that the problems of SOEs can be addressed sufficiently by market forces, 
significant privatization is unnecessary. All reform measures are designed and 
implemented around a central target of establishing a competitive market, leaving the 
ownership structure basically unchanged. The existing evaluations of this model, 
however, are inconclusive and controversial. The review of these evaluations is organized 
into two parts as follows: the first part discusses different interpretations to the nature of 
Chinese reform and the second part examines the empirical evidences presented by 
different schools.  
 
 
Figure 1: China's Economic Performance, 1978-2003
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Data Source: Constructed by the author based on China Statistical Yearbook 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 
2001, 2002. 
 
The Nature of Chinese Reform 
Sachs and Woo 12  identify two schools of thought in interpreting China’s 
successful economic performance and the nature of Chinese reform. One school, labeled 
by Sachs and Woo as ‘experimentalist school,’ attributes the economic success to the 
evolutionary, experimental, and incremental nature of Chinese reform. The other school, 
                                                 
11 All original value of GDP, GDP per capita, industrial output value, and exports in 1978 are treated as 1 
or 100 percent. The growth rates of GDP per capita and export for 2003 are estimated. Therefore, the value 
of exports in 2003, for example, is about 50 times of the value in 1978. Caution: the line of the industrial 
output and value added between 1978 and 1991 reflects the change rate of gross industrial output value, 
while part of this line between 1993 and 2002 reflects the change rate of industrial value added. Therefore, 
this line is inconsistent.   
12 Sachs, J. D., & Woo, W. T. NBER Working Paper #5935, Cambridge, MA, 1997. 
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the ‘convergence school,’ holds that China’s successes are derived from the convergence 
of its institutions with those of existing market economies. Correspondingly, the 
experimentalist school believes that to sustain success China must continue the 
distinctive innovations and exceptional strategies. While the convergence school holds 
that the gradualist nature of Chinese reform is not innovation at all. It simply reflects the 
lack of a comprehensive and coherent reform blueprint in advance. China’s future 
depends on how fast and how well its institutions are harmonized with normal market 
economies. Privatization, therefore, will be inevitable with the progress of harmonization. 
 Specifically, as one of the proponents of the experimentalist school, Naughton13 
argues that the Chinese approach illustrates the feasibility of gradual reform. It shows that 
SOE performance can be improved through incentive mechanisms and competitive 
markets in the context of a state-run economy. Jefferson and Rawski14 argue that the 
expanded autonomy, reconfigured incentive, and dual track system created a competitive 
market structure, which induced SOEs to behave like private firms and resulted in rapid 
economic growth and a significant increase in productivity, demonstrating the viability of 
gradualism and experimentalism of the Chinese model. Focusing on large SOEs in China, 
Nolan and Wang 15 argue that, contrary to the ‘transition orthodoxy,’ large Chinese SOEs 
have grown and modernized rapidly, showing the possibility to reconstruct industrial 
institutions without privatization. McMillan16 attributes China’s economic success to the 
‘nonconformist’ nature of Chinese reform, namely the massive entry of new firms and the 
introduction of profit incentives with only minor privatization. McMillan even advocates 
generalizing a Chinese approach to other transitional countries.  
The most important ingredient of Chinese gradualism is the dual-track system. 
Laffont and Qian17  defend this institutional arrangement, arguing that the dual-track 
system represents a dynamic process in which reform starts in areas or sectors where 
political constraints are weak and then, after building up constituencies and momentum, 
extends to other regions or sectors. This propagation process of the dual track system will 
eventually lead to drastic reforms of overall institutions. Liu and Garinos18 argue that the 
dual track system is optimal because it facilitates competition but avoids the cost of 
ownership transfer. 
The convergence school, however, disagrees on the correlation between 
gradualism and China’s economic performance. Sachs and Woo19 attribute China’s rapid 
economic growth to its extremely low initial condition which provides ample space for 
rapid catching up. China’s phenomenal growth is largely due to the changes outside the 
state sector, including the transfer of surplus agrarian labor to the industrial sector, the 
rapid development of non-state firms, and the openness to the world economy. All these 
                                                 
13 Naughton, B. Growing out of the Plan. 
14 Jefferson, G., & Rawski, T. (1994). “Enterprise Reform”. 
15 Nolan, P., & Wang, X. Beyond Privatization: Institutional Innovation and Growth in China's Large State- 
Owned Enterprises. World Development, 27(1), 169-200, 1998. 
16  McMillan, J. China's Nonconformist Reforms. In E. Lazear (Ed.), Economic Transition in Eastern 
Europe and Russia: Realities of Reform. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1995. 
17 Laffont, J.-J., & Qian, Y. The Dynamics of Reform and Development in China: A Political Economy 
Perspective. European Economic Review, 43, 1105-1114, 1999. 
18 Liu, G. S., & Garinos, G. Privatisation or Competition? Economics of Planning, 34(1-2), 37-51, 2001. 
19 Sachs, J. D., & Woo, W. T. NBER Working Paper. 
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changes have nothing to do with the gradualism20. The increasing deterioration of SOE 
financial performance since the mid-1990s actually illustrates the failure of gradualism. 
Furthermore, they attack the dual-track system, arguing that it merely delays the most 
critical problems China has to overcome for the future.  
Particularly, Sachs, Woo, and Yang 21  point out that, if not recognized that 
economic reforms are only a small part of large scale constitutional transition, the 
assessment of reform performance will be very misleading. In this sense, China’s 
economic success so far might be illusionary because, under political monopoly due to 
the absence of constitutional transition, economic reform will be easily hijacked by state 
opportunism. China’s gradualism represented by the dual track system, despite its short-
term benefits of buying out the vested interests, generates very high long-term costs of 
constitutional transition.  
Qian22, however, argues that gradualism and convergence are not necessarily 
conflicting. Acknowledging that the transitional institutions such as the dual track system 
and fiscal contracting incur higher costs and generate lower benefit than those ‘best 
practice’ institutions, Qian emphasizes that they are the most feasible policy choices for 
Chinese reform. More importantly, the plan track was finally abolished and fiscal 
contracting was ultimately replaced with a rule-based modern tax system, illustrating that 
transitional institutions do not necessarily lead to a partial reform trap, and incremental 
reforms do not always create obstacles to block further reforms. The destiny of Chinese 
reform, of course, is to converge with those of existing market economies in developed 
countries. But the contribution of gradualism and transitional institutions innovated by 
Chinese reform should not be denied because of their ad hoc nature.   
In brief, the interpretations of the nature of Chinese reform and the corresponding 
policy choices they advocated for the future are contentious. Empirical evidences are 
found supportive of different schools of arguments. To look closer at the truth of Chinese 
reform, this paper turns to the empirical studies of the Chinese style approach.   
The Empirical Evidences  
As summarized in table 2, the empirical evidences on Chinese economic and SOE 
reforms are mixed and inconclusive as well. Some found positive correlation between 
reform measures and efficiency or productivity improvement, while others found 
counterproductive or insignificant impact of reforms on firm performance. The following 
discussion of these empirical studies is organized around specific reform measures.  
Table 2: Empirical Studies on Economic and SOE Reforms in China 
 
Study  Sample description, study period, 
and methodology  
 Summary of Empirical 
Findings and Conclusions 
     
Groves,  Using data of 769 SOEs in four  Managers were induced by 
                                                 
20  Sachs, J. D., & Woo, W. T. “Experiences in the Transition to a Market Economy”. Journal of 
Comparative Economics, 18, 271-275, 1994; & Woo, W. T. “The Art of Reforming Centrally Planned 
Economies: Comparing China, Poland, and Russia”. Journal of Comparative Economics, 18, 410-437, 
1994. 
21 Sachs, J. D., Woo, W. T., & Yang, X. Economic Reforms and Constitutional Transition. Unpublished 
Manuscript, 2000. 
22 Qian, Y. “How Reform Worked in China”. William Davidson Institute Working Paper #473, 2002. 
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Hong, 
McMillan, 
and Naughton 
(GHMN)23  
provinces in China from 1980 to 1989, 
examine whether SOE managers 
respond to expanded autonomy to 
strengthen employee incentives and 
whether these incentives lead to 
productivity growth. 
output autonomy and profit 
retention to strengthen worker 
discipline. The fraction of bonus 
in workers’ salary and the 
fraction of contract workers in 
total labor forces generate 
increased productivity. 
However, evidence showing that 
expanded autonomy increase 
pre-tax profit is weak. Much of 
the benefits of autonomy have 
gone to the SOE workers instead 
of remitting to the state.  
 
     
Groves, 
Hong, 
McMillan, 
and 
Naughton24 
 By the same data of 769 SOEs as the 
authors did in 1994 in four provinces in 
China from 1980 to 1989, examine the 
evidence of managerial turnover, the 
relationship of performance to 
managerial contract term and manager 
selection. 
 66 percent of SOEs experienced 
managerial turnover. Managerial 
turnover with prior low 
performance is usually involved 
with auction in the selection, 
larger security deposit and 
shorter managerial contract term 
of new managers. Significant 
performance increase occurred 
under a new manager if the 
previous one was demoted. 
Meanwhile, managerial 
incentives are significantly 
related to linking manager’s pay 
to firm performance. The 
authors conclude that China had 
developed a managerial labor 
market that incorporated many 
of the incentives present in 
Western managerial labor 
markets.  
 
     
                                                                                                                                                 
23  Groves, T., Hong, Y., McMillan, J., & Naughton, B. “Autonomy and Incentives in Chinese State 
Enterprises”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(1), 183-209, 1994. 
24 Groves, T., Hong, Y., McMillan, J., & Naughton, B. “China's Evolving Managerial Labor Market”. The  
Journal of Political Economy, 103(4), 873-892, 1995. 
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Li25  Using a panel data set of 272 SOEs 
from 1980 to 1989, examines the 
effectiveness of China’s incremental 
industrial reform by measuring the 
change of marginal productivity of 
factors and total factor productivity 
(TFP). 
 
 
 The marginal productivity of 
labor and capital except 
intermediate materials 
experienced significant increase. 
Growth in TFP was 4.68 percent 
per year from 1980 to 1989 and 
accounted for over 73 percent of 
output growth. The improved 
resource allocation, growth in 
employee bonus, and the 
increase of competition all 
contribute significantly to the 
growth of TFP. The findings 
suggest that SOE restructuring 
can improve firm performance 
without formal privatization. 
  
     
     
Liu and 
Zhuang26  
 With the same panel data as GHMN 
did in 1994 and 1995 but with a 
different stochastic cost frontier 
function, measure the effect of various 
reform measures on cost efficiency 
which combines both technical and 
allocative efficiency.   
 Despite cost efficiency 
improved annually with 1.18 
percent, the efficiency effects of 
the industrial reform programs 
are mixed. Competition has 
significant positive effect. But 
the expanded autonomy and the 
increased proportion of 
contracted employees are 
counterproductive, and the use 
of bonus has no significant 
effect on cost efficiency. An 
adequate structure of incentives 
remains unsolved. But China’s 
experience shows the SOEs are 
reformable without 
privatization. 
     
Xu, Zhu, and 
Lin27 
 Relying on a data set of 884 SOEs 
nationwide in China during all of 1997 
and the first quarter of 1998, study the 
effects of political control, agency 
problems, and ownership types on the 
performance of reformed SOEs. 
 Both the lessening of politician 
control through expanded 
enterprise autonomy in labor 
deployment and the mitigation 
of agency problems through 
introducing corporate 
governance mechanisms have 
                                                 
25 Li, D. “A Theory of Ambiguous Property Rights in Transition Economies: The Case of the Chinese Non-
state Sector”. Journal of Comparative Economics, 23(1), 1-19, 1996. 
26 Liu, Z., & Zhuang, J. “Evaluating Partial Reforms in the Chinese State Industrial Sector: A Stochastic 
Frontier Cost Function Approach”. International Review of Applied Economics, 12(1), 9-24, 1998. 
27 Xu, L., Zhu, T., & Lin, Y.-M. Politician Control, Agency Problems, and Ownership Reform: Evidence 
from China. Unpublished manuscript, Washington, DC: the World Bank, 2002. 
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positive effect on SOE 
performance. Relative to state 
ownership, foreign ownership 
has positive effect, while 
employee ownership has 
negative effect. Furthermore, 
expanded enterprise autonomy 
except for labor autonomy has a 
negative effect, indicating 
serious agency problems caused 
by partial reform measures. 
     
McGuckin 
and Nguyen28 
(1993) 
 With a data set of enterprises with 
different ownership (state, collective, 
and private) in 1980, 1984, and 1985 
from the industrial census in 1985, 
examine the impact of two waves of 
reforms (1978-1979 and 1983-1984) 
on the change of gross output and 
value-added. 
 Collective and private firms 
outperform SOEs in the growth 
of total factor productivity. The 
proportion of technical workers 
in total workforce is positively 
correlated with productivity 
growth. The profit retention rate 
in SOEs contributes 
significantly to the productivity 
improvement. However, bonus 
to employees has negative 
effects.  
     
Dougherty 
and 
McGuckin29  
 Using data of 23,000 large and medium 
industrial firms in China in 1995, 
isolate the impacts of jurisdiction 
governance and ownership structure 
from other factors on productivity. 
 Regardless of ownership type, 
industrial enterprises controlled 
by local governments exhibit 
significant superior productivity 
to those owned by central 
government. Thus 
decentralization plays a 
prominent role in improving 
firm performance. Among 
centrally controlled firms, 
ownership is a key determinant 
of different productivity 
performance. But for locally 
controlled firms, virtually no 
productivity difference between 
different non-state ownership 
types, indicating local 
government administration 
tends to equalize performance 
across ownership types. 
                                                 
28  McGuckin, R., & Nguyen, S. V. “Post-reform Industrial Productivity Performance in China: New 
Evidence from the 1985 Industrial Census Data”. Economic Inquiry, 31(3), 323-341, 1993. 
29 Dougherty, S., & McGuckin, R. The Effects of Federalism and Privatization on Productivity in Chinese 
Firms. Paper presented at the International Society for New Institutional Economics, 6th Annual Meeting, 
Cambridge, UK, 2001. 
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Sun30  Using data set of 539 SOEs in 13 
industries over 4 provinces from 1990 
to 1994, examine the effects of the 
softness of budget constraints due to 
state ownership and competition on the 
behavior and performance of SOEs. 
 SOEs supervised by central 
government, due to the soft 
budget constraints, exhibit 
higher wage rates but 
significantly lower labor 
productivity and total factor 
productivity. Competition, in 
general, has positive effect on 
the growth of total factor 
productivity. But it is not 
adequate to contain the 
problems of soft budget 
constraints caused by state 
(central government) ownership. 
     
Li, Li, and 
Zhang31  
 With a big data set over 400,000 SOEs 
from the third industrial census in 
China from 1993 to 1995, examine the 
driving forces behind privatization in 
China. 
 Cross-regional competition 
derived from decentralization 
triggers privatization.  
     
Shirley and 
Xu32 (1998; 
2001) 
 Using GHMN panel data set to analyze 
the experience of Performance 
Contracts (PCs), examine whether PCs 
work in China and how firm 
performance was affected by different 
PC provisions, including incentives, 
targets, bidding, contract length, 
managerial bonding, and competition.   
 
 PCs on average were not 
significantly correlated with 
productivity improvements in a 
large sample of SOEs in China. 
PCs can only improve 
productivity when they 
simultaneously specify sensible 
targets, offer strong incentives, 
signal commitment, and in 
competitive environment. And 
PCs tend to achieve the effects 
above under the oversight of 
local government.  
 
     
Xu33  With the same panel data set as GHMN 
did, examine the effects of a series of 
SOE reforms including expanded 
autonomy, increased competition, 
performance contract, and managerial 
 The study finds significant 
positive correlation between 
value-added per employee and 
increasing competition, 
managerial turnover, raising 
                                                 
30 Sun, J.. State-Owned Enterprises in China: Soft Budget Constraints and Competition. Unpublished 
manuscript, Department of Economics, Washington University, St, Louis, MO, 1999. 
31 Li, S., Li, S., & Zhang, W. “The Road to Capitalism: Competition and Institutional Change in China”, 
Journal of Comparative Economics, 28, 269-292, 2000. 
32 Shirley, M., & Xu, L. “Information, Incentives and Commitment: An Empirical Analysis of Contracts 
between Government and State Enterprises”. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 14, 358-378, 
1998 & Shirley, M., & Xu, L. “Empirical Effects of Performance Contracts: Evidence from China”. 
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 17(1), 168-200, 2001. 
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turnover on value-added per employee 
as the proxy of firm performance. 
profit retention rate, and 
managerial discretion on wages 
and production. However, the 
performance contract did not 
improve performance 
significantly.  
     
Huang and 
Kalirajan34  
 Using panel data of 67 SOEs from 
China’s four coastal cities in 1992 and 
a stochastic varying coefficient frontier 
approach, examine the contribution of 
enterprise management reform and the 
competitive market forces to the 
growth of technical efficiency. 
 The proportion of planned 
production in SOEs is 
negatively correlated with the 
firm, capital, and labor specific 
efficiency measures. The 
degrees of participation in 
exports significantly raised the 
technical efficiency. However, 
the enterprise management 
reform measures including asset 
responsibility system, the 
contract system, the director 
responsibility system, and the 
share-holding system have no 
significant correlation with the 
growth of technical efficiency.  
     
Opper35  Using macroeconomic data from 1978 
to 1997, compare different 
employment adjustments in the dual-
track system. 
 The structural adjustment in 
employment in the old planning 
track lagged far behind the 
market track. The increasing 
competition from the market 
track did not force structural 
adjustment of the old track as 
long as institutional settings of 
SOEs are not significantly 
changed. 
     
Lee36  With a panel data set of 681 SOEs in 
four provinces from 1980 to 1994, 
examine the effect of corporatization 
on worker wage, employment, and 
productivity. 
 Corporatization lowered basic 
wages by 11 to 15 percent, but 
the incentive payment keeps 
unchanged. Corporatization 
improves productivity by 6 
percent as well. Evidence shows 
the correlation between 
corporatization and adjusting 
employment is weak. 
Corporatization has the potential 
                                                                                                                                                 
33  Xu, L. Control, “Incentives and Competition: The Impact of Reform on Chinese State-Owned 
Enterprises”. Economics of Transition, 8(1), 151-173, 2000. 
34 Huang, Y., & Kalirajan, K. P. “Enterprise Reform and Technical Efficiency of China's State-Owned 
Enterprises”, Applied Economics, 30, 585-592, 1998. 
35 Opper, S. “Dual-Track Ownership”. 
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to be an effective mechanism to 
restructure troubled SOEs in 
China.  
     
Lin and Zhu37   Using data set of 2,632 corporatized 
SOEs in 1998, present the profile of 
corporatization process and 
organizational features; examine how 
the corporatization process was shaped 
by various factors. 
 Corporatization is seriously 
defective due to continued 
government interference. 
However, such government 
involvement is inevitable 
because of the lack of necessary 
institutions. The long run 
success of corporatization, 
therefore, depends on the 
development of legal and market 
institutions.  
     
Tian38  Using panel data across 30 provinces 
and municipalities in China from 1985 
to 1997, examines the contribution of 
investment from different ownership to 
the growth of GDP and productivity in 
these provinces and municipalities. 
 The more the investment moves 
to private hands, the more GDP 
growth. Provinces with more 
privatization witness greater 
gains in productivity and 
economic growth. And this is 
robust in different categories of 
ownership. 
     
Li and Wu39   Based on a panel data set of 680 SOEs 
in China from 1980 to 1994, examine 
the relative effectiveness of ownership 
transformation and management 
improvement on firm performance 
(total factor productivity and gross rate 
of return on assets). 
 Ownership diversification 
through introduction of other 
types of ownership yield 
significant improvement in 
performance of SOEs. While the 
effects of management reform 
including expanded autonomy 
and profit incentives are mixed. 
China, therefore, should focus 
on ownership reforms in the 
future. 
     
Wen, Li, and 
Lloyd40  
 Comparing enterprises with all 
different ownership types within six 
industries as well as across these 
industries from the third industrial 
census of China in 1995, examine the 
 Evidence shows that enterprises 
with ownership types other than 
state ownership, domestic 
collective ownership, and joint 
domestic ownership are 
                                                                                                                                                 
36 Lee, Y. “Wages and Employment in China's SOEs, 1980-1994: Corporatization, Market Development, 
and Insider Forces”. Journal of Comparative Economics, 27, 702-729, 1999. 
37 Lin, Y.-M., & Zhu, T. “The Restructuring of Ownership and Governance in China: An Empirical Study 
of the Shareholding Reform”. Seoul Journal of Economics, 13(3), 279-300, 2000. 
38 Tian, L. “Government Shareholding and the Value of China's Modern Firms”. Unpublished manuscript, 
2002. 
39 Li, D., & Wu, C. “The Ownership School vs. the Management School of State Enterprise Reform: 
Evidence from China”. William Davidson Institute Working Paper #435, 2002. 
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relationship between ownership and 
technical efficiency with the stochastic 
frontier production function approach. 
  
technically more efficient on 
average than these three 
ownership types. 
     
Zhang, 
Zhang, and 
Zhao41 
 Via a panel data set covering all 
industrial enterprises in Shanghai from 
1996 to 1998, examine and quantify 
the effect of ownership and market 
competition on the productive 
efficiency and efficiency growth. 
 Different ownership types lead 
to significantly different 
efficiency levels, with foreign 
ownership exhibiting highest 
efficiency and SOEs lowest. The 
degree of competition from 
international market is 
positively associated with firm 
efficiency. However, domestic 
competition has no such 
correlation with efficiency. The 
ownership effects are robust 
across different competitive 
markets and different industries, 
indicating the overwhelming 
effects of ownership to 
competition. 
 
  
The analysis above presents a brief description of the market oriented Chinese 
reform. The evaluations of this Chinese model, nevertheless, are mixed and inconclusive. 
The empirical studies verify the contributions of Chinese reform to the spectacular 
economic performance, but also find extreme limitations of the competition without 
privatization strategy. In fact, despite those market measures introduced since the end of 
the1970s, including the expanded autonomy, the use of incentives and contracts, and 
corporatization, the financial performance of SOEs has been increasingly deteriorating 
since the early 1990s. According to Sachs and Woo42, two-thirds of SOEs ran losses in 
1992 even with a 13 percent output growth in that year. And in 1996, with total loss at 
79.07 billion RMB and total profits at only 41.26 billion RMB43, the whole SOE sector 
slid into deficit for the first time. The National Statistical Bureau reports that, in 1998, the 
ratio of total debt (the sum of liquid liabilities and long term liabilities) to total assets in 
SOEs is 65.9 percent, with 2.2 percent higher than average level nationwide; and the debt 
interest accounts for 37.9 percent of the total sale profits.44 
Having realized the limitations of competition without privatization, the 15th 
Communist Party Congress in 1997 officially proclaimed an ownership transformation 
                                                                                                                                                 
40 Wen, M., Li, D., & Lloyd, P. “Ownership and Technical Efficiency: A Cross-Section Study on the Third  
Industrial Census of China”. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 50(3), 709-734, 2002. 
41 Zhang, A., Zhang, Y., & Zhao, R. “Impact of Ownership and Competition on the Productivity of Chinese  
Enterprises”. Journal of Comparative Economics, 29, 327-346, 2001. 
42 Sachs, J. D., & Woo, W. T. NBER Working Paper. 
43 Qi, D., Wu, W., & Zhang, H. “Shareholding Structure and Corporate Performance of Partially Privatized 
Firms: Evidence from Listed Chinese Companies”. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 8, 587-610, 2000. 
44 National Bureau of Statistics. The Prosperous Industrial Economy. Beijing: National Statistical Bureau, 
1999. 
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policy of ‘grabbing the large and letting go of the small ones,’ namely privatizing the 
medium and small SOEs but retaining the dominance of state ownership in large ones. 
China’s privatization, once again, is characterized by the dual-track strategy. Despite the 
reserved commitment of the leadership, China’s privatization accelerated. The Chinese 
reform formally entered its fourth phase of privatization.  
PRIVATIZATION IN CHINA 
China undertook the sale of state property to the private sectors – the strict 
definition of privatization, although occurring very late at the end of the 1990s, including 
the Share Issuance Privatizations (SIPs) and direct sale of state assets. Particularly, 
China’s commitment to a massive or large-scale ‘normal’ privatization program seemed 
intensified in recent years.  
China started SIPs in December 1990 and July 1991 with the inauguration of two 
stock exchanges in Shanghai (SHSE) and Shenzhen (SZSE), respectively. SIPs grew 
rapidly in China, although with significant instability. In 2000, the total market 
capitalization in two stock markets accounted for more than half of GDP. The basic 
information of SIPs is summarized in table 3. 
 
Table 3: Basic Information of Share Issuance Privatizations in China, 1992-200245 
 
Year Number 
of Total 
Listed 
Firms 
Total Market 
Capitalization 
(100 Million 
RMB) 
Ratio of 
Market 
Capitaliza
tion to 
GDP  
Float Market 
Capitalization 
(100 Million 
RMB) 
Ratio of Float 
Market to 
Market 
Capitalization 
1992 53 1048.00 3.93% N/A N/A
1993 183 3531.00 10.20% 862.00 24.41%
1994 291 3690.61 7.89% 969.00 26.26%
1995 323 3474.00 5.94% 938.00 27.00%
1996 530 9842.00 14.50% 2867.00 29.13%
1997 745 17529.00 23.54% 5204.00 29.69%
1998 851 19506.00 24.90% 5746.00 29.46%
1999 949 26471.20 32.26% 8214.00 31.03%
2000 1088 48090.90 53.77% 16088.00 33.45%
2001 1154 43522.20 45.37% 14463.00 33.23%
2002 1223 38329.13 37.43% 12484.00 32.57%
 
The blueprint for SIPs is the Company Law effective on July 1st, 1994. In 
accordance with this law and other relevant regulations, tradable shares are divided into 
domestic (A- shares) and foreign (B-shares, sold solely to foreign investors and residents 
from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan; H-shares, issued in Hong Kong stock market; and 
N-shares, issued in New York stock market). The average ratio of foreign shares to all 
                                                 
45 This table is constructed by the author based on China Statistical Yearbook 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 
2000, 2001, 2002 (National Statistical Bureau) and the website of China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) at www.csrc.gov.cn  
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companies is less than 2.5 percent46. Due to their insignificance, analyses of foreign 
shares are simply omitted in this research.  
Not all shares in any listed SOEs are publicly tradable. That is, the publicly traded 
A-shares only account for a portion of the total shares in listed SOEs. The Company Law 
requires the ratio of A-shares to be 25 percent or more of total outstanding shares when 
the company makes its initial public offering. But in practice this ordinance was not 
followed particularly in the early stages47, the actual ratio of A-shares ranges from 17 to 
33 percent of total shares48. A-shares are the only type of equity that is permitted to be 
traded among domestic investors at the two exchanges. Hence the total shares or the total 
market capitalizations in Chinese stock markets do not reflect the true traded volume. 
Instead, China uses an unusual indicator of “float market capitalization” to measure the 
value of tradable A-shares, which accounts for about 33 percent of total market 
capitalization in recent years. The effects of A-shares on firm performance in China are 
inconclusive and controversial. Most scholars argue that A-shares have a trivial impact 
on corporate governance owing to two reasons: A-shares are extremely dispersed and the 
turnover rates of A-shares are exceptionally high (the average holding period is about 1 to 
2 months, compared with 18 months in United States49, indicating the investors have low 
motivations and usually free-ride to monitor firm performance because of the loose 
correlation of cost and benefit of such behaviors. However, still some researchers argue 
that A-shares have positive performance effects owing to their nature of pure private 
ownership. 
Besides tradable A-shares, a listed SOE has three other shares: state shares, legal 
person shares, and employee shares. State shares are held by the central government or 
local governments, but usually controlled by state asset management agencies, financial 
bureaus, or solely state-owned investment companies. To preserve the dominance of state 
ownership, it is required that SOEs must issue shares to the government for free and these 
state shares must not be less than 35 percent of total shares. This requirement, however, 
was not well followed in practice either. In 1995, the state controlled 35 percent of total 
shares in SHSE listed firms but only 22 percent in SZSE50. Nevertheless, in many cases, 
the largest shareholder is always the state, without any comparable and contestable 
second or third largest shareholders. By 1999, for example, 42 percent of the largest 
shareholders are state shares51. State shares are not permitted to be publicly traded, but 
are transferable to domestic institutions even including private institutions upon the 
approval of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). SIPs in China, 
therefore, are a kind of partial privatization. Although theoretically some researchers 
argue the desirability of partial privatization 52  , generally, most view it as a poor 
                                                 
46 Sun, Q., & Tong, W. H. S. “China Share Issue Privatization: The Extent of it Success”. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 70, 183-222, 2003 (henceforth “China Share Issue”). 
47 Mok, H. M. K. “The Evolution of China's Stock Market”. In C. K. Lo & T. K. Yuen (Eds.), China 
Review1995 (pp. 1-14). Beijing: Chinese University Press, 1995. 
48 Sun, Q., & Tong, W. H. S. “China Share Issue”. 
49 Xu, X., & Wang, Y. “Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance in Chinese Stock  Companies”. 
China Economic Review, 10, 75-98, 1999 (henceforth “Ownership Structure”). 
50 Ibid. 
51 Tenev, S., Zhang, C., & Brefort, L. Corporate Governance. 
52 Jefferson, G. China's State Enterprises: Public Goods, Externalities, and Coase. American Economic 
Review, 88, 428-432, 1998; Perotti, E. C. Credible Privatization. American Economic Review, 85, 847-859, 
Competition or Privatization: China’s Experience in SOE Reform 
 Spring 2006, Vol.1, No.1    53
governance structure, making monitoring difficult and the mechanisms of takeover and 
bankruptcy incredible.  
Legal person shares are held by domestic institutions, including industrial 
enterprises, stock companies, trust and investment companies, foundations and funds, 
construction and real estate companies, transportation and power companies, and 
technology and research institutes53. Most of them, however, are eventually state owned. 
As in the case of state shares, many of the largest shareholders are the holders of legal 
person shares. In 1995, for example, 24 percent of legal person shareholders in SHSE-
listed firms held more than 50 percent of total outstanding shares and the same case for 
25 percent of SZSE-listed firms54. Legal person shares are not allowed to be publicly 
traded, but transferable upon the approval of CSRC. Hence in most cases, the state 
directly or indirectly (through legal person shares) owns and controls listed companies. 
Although most domestic institutions are eventually state owned, those with legal person 
status are somehow independent from the state with separate accounting systems and 
self-responsibility for benefits and losses. Thus legal person shareholders are suggested to 
have more incentives than the state to monitor listed firms for efficiency improvement 
and profit maximization. But still other researchers argue that legal person shares are 
vulnerable to state interference, and, moreover, sometimes legal person shareholders may 
benefit themselves at the expense of other shareholders55. 
Employee shares only make up less than 2 percent of total shares, functioning 
primarily as benefits for employees and management rather than an incentive mechanism 
and completely unimportant in firm operation. After having been held for 6 to 12 months, 
employee shares can be sold in the open stock market upon the approval of CSRC. The 
issuance of employee shares was discontinued in 1998, making it even more insignificant 
in the ownership structure.  
To summarize, the patterns of ownership structure in Chinese listed firms through 
Share Issuance Privatizations (SIPs) are as follows: 
(1) SIPs in China are partial privatizations. The state still retains substantial 
shares in most of the listed firms.  
(2) Correspondingly, ownership structures are relatively concentrated. Tenev et 
al. find in their sample of 257 SHSE-listed firms in 1999 that, on average, the 
three largest shareholders held 58 percent of total shares, of which the largest 
one held 47 percent, 8 percent for the second largest and 3 percent for the 
third largest56.  
(3) The total shares are equally divided among three parts: state shares, legal 
person shares, and tradable A-shares, with each accounting for approximately 
30 percent of total outstanding shares.  
                                                                                                                                                 
1995; Schmitz, P. W. Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: the Proper Scope of Government 
Reconsidered. FinanzArchiv, 57, 395-411, 2000. 
53 Tenev, S., Zhang, C., & Brefort, L. Corporate Governance. 
54 Xu, X., & Wang, Y. “Ownership Structure”. 
55 Chen, Y. M., & Gong, S. C. Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance: Some Chinese Evidence. 
In T. A. Fetherston (Ed.), Advances in Pacific Basin Financial Markets (Vol. 6, pp. 177-193). New York: 
JAI, 2000; Sun, Q., & Tong, W. H. S. “China Share Issue”. 
56 Tenev, S., Zhang, C., & Brefort, L. Corporate Governance. 
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(4) The tradable A-shares are highly dispersed with exceptionally high turnover 
rates, indicating individual investors in China primarily seek short-term 
trading profits rather than dividend or long term growth.  
(5) Legal person shareholders are similar to the institutional investors in the 
advanced market economies, with most of them eventually state owned or 
controlled.  
Consequently, the governance structures, consisting of the board of directors, 
supervisory committee, and shareholder annual meeting, are biased to the control of state 
or legal person shareholders. First of all, the board of directors is overrepresented by state 
and legal person shareholders. Although each of state shares, legal person shares, and 
tradable A-shares makes up approximately 30 percent of total shares, the board 
membership controlled by A-shares is extremely low. Xu and Wang  find that, in their 
sample of 154 listed firms in 1995, individual shareholders have no more than 0.3 percent 
of the total board seats on average57. Tenev el al. find a much higher ratio in their sample 
of 257 SHSE-listed firms 58 , but still with no more than 6 percent of total board 
membership representing individual shareholders. On contrast, based on different 
samples, some find that the state is highly overrepresented with 50 percent of board 
membership59, others find the legal persons are overrepresented with 63 percent of board 
seats60. Secondly, such highly biased governance structures occurred in the supervisory 
committee and shareholder annual meeting as well, characterized with extremely low 
presence of individual shareholders. In short, the governance structure is not proportional 
to the ownership structure, with biases to the state or legal person shareholders.  
These ownership and governance structures seem problematic, reflected in the 
deteriorating performance of Chinese stock markets in the past years. The average 
earnings per share was 0.35 RMB in 1994, 0.27 in 1995, 0.29 in 1996, 0.248 in 1997, 
0.185 in 1998, 0.2069 in 1999, 0.211 in 2000, 0.136 in 2001, and 0.127 in 200261, while 
China’s GDP was soaring during the same period. However, some researchers argue that 
such structural arrangements, even though inconsistent with the best practices, are 
feasible adaptations to the particular political and economic conditions in China, 
reflecting the government’s serious concerns to protect stock markets and their 
commitments for continuous Share Issuance Privatizations. In other words, through 
remaining substantial state ownership and disproportionately high state control, the 
government can maintain an orderly flow of privatization so as not to overwhelm the 
fledgling stock markets and thus make it possible for following Share Issuance 
Privatizations in the future. Meanwhile, high state shares signal the government’s 
confidence in the listed firms and a business guarantee, lowering the ex ante uncertainties 
for domestic investors 62 . Nevertheless, others argue that if the firm performance 
                                                 
57 Xu, X., & Wang, Y. “Ownership Structure”. 
58 Tenev, S., Zhang, C., & Brefort, L. Corporate Governance. 
59 Xu, X., & Wang, Y. “Ownership Structure”. 
60 Tenev, S., Zhang, C., & Brefort, L. Corporate Governance. 
61  Han, Q. Solving the Conflict between Tradable and Non-tradable Stock, from http://www.  
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continued deteriorating, both the concerns to protect stock markets and the optimal signal 
effects would fail. Resorting to empirical evidences, therefore, is the best way to clarify 
the debate and figure out what on earth the effects of such ownership and governance 
structures on firm performance are. The findings from these empirical studies on Share 
Issuance Privatization (SIPs) in China are summarized in table 4 as follow: 
Table 4: Empirical Studies on Share Issuance Privatizations (SIPs) in China 
  
Study  Sample description, study 
period, and methodology  
 Summary of Empirical Findings and 
Conclusions 
     
Xu and 
Wang63  
 Using panel data set of all listed 
firms in China from 1993 to 1995, 
examine the effects of ownership 
concentration on firm performance 
and then differentiate the effects of 
different ownership type with 
particular focuses on state 
ownership and legal person 
ownership. The proxies of 
performance are the market-to-
book value ratio (MBR), return on 
equity (ROE), and return on assets 
(ROA). Ownership concentration 
is measured by the proportion of 
shares held by the top 10 
shareholders. 
 Ownership concentration has significant 
impact on performance. Because the 
largest shareholders usually concentrate 
on state and legal person shareholders, 
this impact should be interpreted as 
positive correlation of firm performance 
to state and legal person ownership 
concentration. However, the positive 
effects on firm performance are only 
found in the legal person ownership 
types. Both state ownership and 
individual ownership are negatively 
correlated with firm performance.  
Furthermore, the inefficiency of state 
ownership is evident in its deviating 
political objectives in excessive 
employment. 
     
Qi, Wu, and 
Zhang64  
 With a data set of all listed firms 
in SHSE from 1991 to 1996, 
examine the relationship between 
shareholding (ownership) structure 
and firm performance. 
 Firm performance is positively 
correlated with the proportion of legal 
person shares but negatively related with 
state shares. Moreover, performance 
increases with the degree of relative 
dominance of legal person shares to state 
shares. However, the relationship 
between firm performance and tradable 
A-shares and foreign B-shares is 
insignificant. 
     
 
 
    
 
     
Sun and 
Tong65  
 With a panel data set of 634 listed 
firms in China from 1994 to 1998, 
 Real net profit (RNP) increased 
significantly after SIPs, but the ratio of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Profitability? Unpublished manuscript, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong, 2002; Mok, 
H. M. K., & Hui, Y. V. (1998). Underpricing and the Aftermarket Performance of IPOs in Shanghai, China. 
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 6, 453-474. 
63 Xu, X., & Wang, Y. “Ownership Structure”. 
64 Qi, D., Wu, W., & Zhang, H. “Shareholding Structure”. 
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examine the effects of Share 
Issuance Privatizations (SIPs) on 
firm performance by MNR 
method66 , namely comparing the 
performance of 3 year pre- and 3 
year post-privatization. 
Meanwhile, they explore the 
relationship between performance 
changes and ownership structural 
changes after privatization.   
profit to sales decreased. And, contrary 
to other findings, leverage level 
increased after privatization increased. 
These results are robust with considering 
the changes in macroeconomic activities, 
indicating partial privatization through 
SIPs in China achieved limited success. 
Further analyses show negative effects 
of state ownership on firm performance, 
but increase in legal person ownership 
and foreign ownership contribute 
positively to performance improvement. 
     
Jia, Sun, 
and Tong67  
 Using panel data of 41 firms listed 
in Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
from 1993 to 1998, compare 
performance changes after 
privatization with MNR methods 
and explore the relationship 
between different ownership type 
and performance changes. 
 Net profit dropped after privatization, 
but without statistical significance. 
However, returns on sales, on assets, and 
on equity all significantly decreased 
after privatization. Moreover, 
privatization did not result in reduction 
of leverage. Nevertheless, real output 
increased significantly. Further analyses 
show that the remaining state ownership 
has a negative role in profitability, while 
the legal person shares and foreign 
shares contribute positively to 
performance improvement. 
     
Chen, Firth, 
and Rui68  
 Using panel data set of 735 listed 
firms privatized from 1991 to 
1997, examine the effects of Share 
Issuance Privatizations on 
profitability, asset efficiency, 
capital expenditure, sales, and debt 
ratios with MNR methodology but 
extending the post-privatization 
period to 5 years.  
 Both profitability, measured by the 
ratios of profit to sales, assets, and 
equity, and asset efficiency, measured by 
the ratio of sales to assets, deteriorated 
significantly after privatization. Though 
sales and capital expenditure 
efficiencies, measured by the ratios of 
capital expenditure to sales and to assets, 
improved significantly. Moreover, the 
debt to equity ratios dropped after 
privatization. These findings are robust 
across different ownership types. 
Privatization in China, therefore, is 
unsuccessful at least in terms of 
profitability and efficiency. 
                                                                                                                                                 
65 Sun, Q., & Tong, W. H. S. “China Share Issue”. 
66 Megginson, Nash, and Randenborgh in 1994 first use the comparison of 3 year pre and 3 year post 
privatization to measure the effects of privatization on firm performance. Then Megginson and Netter 
(2001) call it as ‘MNR’ methodology. 
67 Jia, J., Sun, Q., & Tong, W. H. S. (2002). Privatization via Overseas Listing: Evidence from China's H-
Share Firms. Unpublished manuscript. 
68 Chen, G., Firth, M., & Rui, O. Have China's Enterprise Reforms Led to Improved Efficiency and 
Profitability? Unpublished manuscript, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong, 2002. 
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Wei, 
Varela, 
D’Souza, 
and 
Hassan69  
 Using panel data set of 208 listed 
firms (but for some regressions, 
only 82 firms are used) in China 
from 1990 to 1997, measure the 
effects of privatization on firm 
performance with MNR methods 
and then compare the performance 
difference.  
 Profitability represented by net profit 
experienced significant increase, but 
return to sales has insignificant changes. 
Both real sales and real assets increased 
significantly. However, employment had 
insignificant increase. Sales per 
employee increased and leverage 
decreased, both significantly. Further 
analysis shows privatized firms 
outperform full state-owned firms in 
profitability. Therefore, privatization 
works in China. 
     
Wang 70  Using a panel data set including 
all listed firms in China from 1994 
to 2000, examine the effects of 
two different types of state 
shareholders, bureaucratic state 
shareholders and corporate state 
shareholders, on firm performance 
and managerial turnovers. 
 Firms with corporate state shareholders 
(SOEs or state-owned economic entities 
act as shareholders) outperform those 
firms with bureaucratic state 
shareholders (government bureaus act as 
shareholders). Meanwhile, managerial 
turnovers in firms with bureaucratic 
shareholders are less sensitive to poor 
performance. No significant differences 
of performance and managerial 
turnovers exist between firms with 
corporate state shareholders and those 
without state shares at all. 
     
Chang and 
Wong71  
 With a survey data of 71 firms 
listed on SHSE from 1997 to 
1999, examine the effects of 
political interference with proxies 
of the degrees of party control and 
the presence of government 
representatives on the board on 
firm performance. 
 By separating the effects of political 
interferences from agency problems, 
both the degree of party control and the 
increasing ratio of the presence of 
government representative on the board 
have detrimental impact on firm 
performance. 
     
Wong, 
Opper, and 
Hu72  
 Using the same survey data set 
Chang and Wong did in 2002, 
examine the relationship between 
ownership structure, political 
 Party control is negatively correlated 
with the ratio of tradable A-shares, but 
has insignificant relationship with the 
ratios of legal person shares or foreign 
                                                 
69 Wei, Z., Varela, O., D'Souza, J., & Hassan, K. “The Financial and Operating Performance of China's 
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70 Wang, J. Governance Role of Different Types of State Shareholders: Evidence from China's Listed 
Companies. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, The Hong Kong University of Science & Technology, 
Hong Kong., 2002. 
71  Chang, E. C., & Wong, S. M. L. Corporate Governance, Political Interference, and Corporate 
Performance of China's Listed Companies. Unpublished manuscript, 2002. 
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interference (party control), and 
firm performance. 
shares. Furthermore, party control is 
significantly negatively correlated with 
performance measured by ROA and 
ROE. This negative effect, however, can 
be significantly mitigated by the 
existence of legal person shares, but not 
by A-shares or foreign shares. Therefore, 
both exit (increasing the ratio of A-
shares) and voice (increasing the ratio of 
legal person shares) channels exist to 
address the party control problem in 
listed firms of China. 
     
Fan, Lau, 
and Wu73  
 Using a panel data set of 496 listed 
firms in China from 1997 to 1999, 
examine the effects of ownership 
structure, board structure, and 
managerial compensation on firm 
performance. 
 Ownership concentration and the 
fraction of employee shares have 
positive impacts on firm performance, 
but the ratio of major officer’s 
shareholdings does not. Both the ratio of 
insider directors and managerial 
compensation are insignificantly 
correlated with firm performance, 
indicating the supportive evidences for 
the effectiveness of governance 
mechanisms in Chinese listed firms are 
weak. 
     
Tian74   With all listed firms in China from 
1994 to 1998, examine the impact 
of different shareholdings on 
corporate value. 
 The government shareholding is 
negatively correlated with corporate 
value. This relationship, however, is not 
monotonic. That is, when the share of 
government shareholding is small and 
dominated by non-government 
shareholdings, the negative impact is 
small too. With more shareholdings 
moving to government, the detrimental 
effect increases. But when government 
shareholdings are sufficiently large as to 
dominantly control the firm, the negative 
correlation decrease again. The U-shape 
relationship indicates government can be 
both detrimental and helpful.  
 
                                                 
73 Fan, D., Lau, C.-M., & Su, S. “Corporate Governance Mechanisms”. In A. Tsui & C.-M. Lau (Eds.), The 
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CONCLUSION 
The objective of this paper is to provide an understanding of the nature of China’s 
SOE reform. It began with the description of the Chinese model for economic reform. 
This Chinese approach, despite its spectacular economic achievements, demonstrated an 
incomplete and informal nature in many of its institutions. These limitations were 
primarily from the central strategy and assumption of the Chinese SOE reform, namely 
SOEs could be improved simply with competitive forces, significant ownership 
transformation was unnecessary. Market measures, including enterprise autonomy, 
incentives, price liberalization, and corporatization, were all introduced and tried to save 
SOEs. However, SOE performance has been increasingly deteriorating since the early 
1990s.  
Having realized the limitations of the Chinese model, China officially initiated 
privatization programs in the late 1990s. Particularly, the generally defined privatization, 
the sale of state property, particularly the Share Issuance Privatizations (SIPs), developed 
rapidly in the 1990s. These privatizations, however, were tainted by the incomplete and 
informal nature of Chinese reform, reflected in their biased ownership structure and 
ineffective corporate governance, which is further embodied in the limited performance 
improvement in those listed firms.  
It seems that privatization is clearly the answer for China’s future SOE reform. 
Particularly, the empirical studies show that private ownership outperformed state 
ownership in almost every area. In order to maintain the current momentum of rapid 
economic growth, China should commit itself in a comprehensive and fundamental 
ownership transformation from state ownership to private ownership. China’s experience 
in SOE reform, therefore, only provided proofs that privatization is ultimately the 
fundamental way for economic transition, although it requires more deliberate design and 
more effective management.  
